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Getting Sex “Right”: Heteronormativity and Biologism in Trans 
and Intersex Marriage Litigation and Scholarship 
DAVID B. CRUZ* 
ABSTRACT 
This Essay criticizes two negative tendencies in legal scholarship, lawyers’ 
arguments, and judicial opinions addressing the legal sex of and the validity of 
marriages involving transsexual and intersex persons.  First, some pro-trans-
recognition arguments display a tendency to treat questions of a person’s legal sex as 
simply a matter of biomedical fact or “truth.”  These arguments typically treat views 
rejecting transgender persons’ self-identified sex as objectionable primarily for their 
failure to get sex “right,” that is, their failure to enshrine in law the current views of 
medical practitioners.  Second, and relatedly, some pro-recognition arguments manifest 
an undefended heteronormativity, naturalizing not only sex, but also cross-sex desires.  
Canvassing U.S. judicial decisions in marriage-related cases that reject claims that a 
litigant’s sex had been legally changed, this Essay argues both that these arguments’ 
heterosexism is objectionable and unnecessary for making effective sex recognition 
arguments, and that the “getting sex right” approach fails to appreciate how legal sex is 
a normative, regulatory tool, not a natural fact.  “Getting sex right” risks unaccountable 
legal decision-making and transfers of power to an alternative regime, that of medicine, 
that may seem more congenial than the legal arena at the current moment, but which is 
not guaranteed to promote the liberty and equality of transgender, or indeed any, 
persons. 
 
Litigants, judges, and scholars around the world have grappled with issues 
of sex determination.  A frequent site of contestation has been civil marriage, 
which in modern times has, until recently, been formally restricted in most 
western jurisdictions to a union of one man and one woman.1  When the validity 
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 1. As of the writing of this Essay, the Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, Canada, South Africa, 
Norway, Sweden, Portugal, Iceland, and Argentina are the only countries that allow same-sex 
couples to marry.  Massachusetts, Connecticut, Iowa, Vermont and New Hampshire are the only 
states in the U.S.A. to do so, along with the District of Columbia.  In addition, the Coquille Tribe (in 
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of a marriage involving a transsexual or intersex person has been challenged, 
courts have had to respond, and have done so in countries including Australia, 
Canada, New Zealand, South Africa, the United States, the United Kingdom, 
and the European Union.  The decisions have been mixed, some ruling against 
the transgender parties, some recognizing their lived sex.  But critiques of the 
non-recognition decisions and arguments in favor of recognition have too often 
been framed either in terms that reinforce heterosupremacy, or as if the only 
problem has been the law’s failure to follow some medical practitioners in 
embracing a more nuanced version of biological sex.  While this approach, 
which I call “getting sex right,” could have some positive results, I argue in this 
essay that it rests on a mistaken—and dangerous—view of legal sex as a mirror 
of natural fact. 
As just noted, some progressive decisions have recognized the sex/gender 
of transpersons who have undergone surgical procedures, and concomitantly 
the validity of marriages into which they have entered.  These include M.T. v. 
J.T.,2 decided by an intermediate appellate court in New Jersey in 1976; the 
declaratory judgment action decided by the High Court of Wellington in 
Attorney General v Otahuhu Family Court3 in New Zealand in 1994; the case of In 
re Kevin,4 decided October 2001 by Justice Richard Chisholm of the Family Court 
of Australia and affirmed on appeal; and the landmark 2002 judgment of the 
European Court of Human Rights in Goodwin v. U.K.5 
In many other instances, however, courts continue expressly to follow the 
unfortunate biologism of the path-breaking 1970 English judgment in Corbett v. 
Corbett (otherwise Ashley).6  Corbett began with a suit seeking a declaration of 
legal nullity of a marriage brought by an uncontested male, Arthur Corbett, 
against a transsexual woman,7 April Ashley; Corbett had married Ashley with 
full knowledge that she had been identified male at birth and in adulthood had 
undergone various “sex reassignment” procedures, including vagino-plasty.8  
As framed by Justice Ormrod, “[t]he case . . . resolves itself into the primary 
issue of the validity of the marriage, which depends on the true sex of the 
respondent, and the secondary issue of the incapacity of the parties, or their 
respective willingness or unwillingness, to consummate the marriage, if there 
was a marriage to consummate.”9  The court held that the concordance of 
genitals, chromosomes, and gonads at birth naturally and indelibly marks a 
 
Oregon) allows couples to marry regardless of the parties’ sexes.  See generally Julie Bushyhead, The 
Coquille Indian Tribe, Same-Sex Marriage, and Spousal Benefits: A Practical Guide, 26 ARIZ. J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 509 (2009). 
 2. 355 A.2d 204, 210-11 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976). 
 3. (1995) 1 NZLR 603, 607 (HC). 
 4. [2001] 28 Fam LR 158 (Austl.). 
 5. 35 Eur. Ct. H.R. 18 (2002); see also I v. United Kingdom, (2003) 36 E.H.R.R. 53. 
 6. 2 All E.R. 33 (1970) (Eng.). 
 7. By this I mean someone who currently identifies as a woman but who had been identified as 
male at birth.  In this Essay I will also refer to such individuals as “transwomen” or “women with a 
transsexual history.”  Their gender counterparts are “transsexual men” or “transmen” or “men with 
a transsexual history.” 
 8. See Corbett, 2 All E.R. at 36-37, 50. 
 9. Id. at 35 (emphasis added). 
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person as being of one specific sex for life,10 that April Corbett née Ashley was 
therefore male, and that her marriage to Arthur was thus void because it was 
between two men rather than between a man and a woman.11 
Corbett is in many respects an outrageous decision.  The judge showed 
some, albeit limited, sympathy for the parties, including April,12 but he adopted 
one expert’s dismissive characterization of her: “the pastiche of femininity was 
convincing.”13  He also naturalized and essentialized heterosexual marriage, 
avowing that “sex is clearly an essential determinant of the relationship called 
marriage, because it is and always has been recognised as the union of man and 
woman.  It is the institution on which the family is built, and in which the 
capacity for natural heterosexual intercourse is an essential element.”14  He then 
deployed, to unfortunate end, a classic, though increasingly contested,15 feminist 
distinction: according to Ormrod, “[m]arriage is a relationship which depends 
on sex and not on gender.”16  Because for Ormrod, like diamonds, sex is forever, 
the fact that no one claimed April had been mistakenly identified as a boy at 
birth meant nature doomed her to eternal maleness.17 
And, if that weren’t enough to invalidate her marriage to playboy Arthur, 
Ormrod would have 
h[e]ld that the respondent was physically incapable of consummating a 
marriage because I do not think that sexual intercourse, using the completely 
artificial cavity constructed by Dr Burou, can possibly be described . . . as 
“ordinary and complete intercourse” or as “vera copula—of the natural sort of 
coitus.”  In my judgment, it is the reverse of ordinary, and in no sense natural.  
When such a cavity has been constructed in a male, the difference between 
sexual intercourse using it, and anal or intra-crural intercourse is, in my 
judgment, to be measured in centimetres.18 
Such reliance on putative, unchanging, natural facts of sex is, 
unfortunately, not confined to the English judiciary.  United States federal sex 
discrimination law, contained in the statute commonly referred to as “Title VII,” 
 
 10. See id. at 48 (“[I]f all three [i.e., chromosomes, gonads, and genitals] are congruent, [the law 
should] determine the sex for the purpose of marriage accordingly, and ignore any operative [i.e., 
surgical] intervention.”). 
 11. Id. at 50. 
 12. See, e.g., id. at 36 (“I have been at some pains to avoid the use of emotive expressions such as 
‘castration’ and ‘artificial vagina’ without the qualification ‘so-called,’ because the association of 
ideas connected with these words or phrases are [sic] so powerful that they tend to cloud clear 
thinking.”). 
 13. Id. at 47. 
 14. Id. at 48 (emphasis added). 
 15. See, e.g., KATE BORNSTEIN, GENDER OUTLAW: ON MEN, WOMEN, AND THE REST OF US 30 
(1994) (arguing that biological sex should be understood as just one of many understandings or 
types of gender); JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY 8-9 
(1990) (arguing against the view that sex is a pre-social bedrock upon which gender is constructed). 
 16. Corbett v. Corbett, 2 All E.R. 33, 49 (1970) (Eng.). 
 17. See, e.g., id. at 47 (“The only cases where the term ‘change of sex’ is appropriate are those in 
which a mistake as to sex is made at birth and subsequently revealed by further medical 
investigation.”). 
 18. Id. at 49. 
Cruz_proof_021611 2/19/2011  12:01:42 PM 
206 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY Volume 18:203 2010 
makes it unlawful to fire someone “because of” that person’s “sex.”19  When 
commercial airline pilot Karen Ulane was fired by Eastern Airlines after 
transitioning from male to female, she sued arguing that her firing was because 
of sex.20  Although the trial court agreed,21 the federal appellate court reversed in 
Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., holding that this was not discrimination because of 
sex, but discrimination because Ulane was transsexual,22 which the court said 
Congress did not intend to prohibit when it adopted Title VII in 1964.23  “The 
phrase in Title VII prohibiting discrimination based on sex, in its plain meaning, 
implies that it is unlawful to discriminate against women because they are 
women and against men because they are men [,]” and, the court added, “a 
prohibition against discrimination based on an individual’s sex is not 
synonymous with a prohibition against discrimination based on an 
individual’s . . . discontent with the sex into which they were born.”24 
It is that circumstance of biology at birth that determined Ulane’s sexual 
destiny.  The appellate court graciously conceded that “Ulane is entitled to any 
personal belief about her sexual identity she desires.  After the surgery, 
hormones, appearance changes, and a new Illinois birth certificate and FAA 
pilot’s certificate, it may be that society, as the trial judge found, considers Ulane 
to be female.”25  Then, however, the court dug in its heels: 
But even if one believes that a woman can be so easily created from what 
remains of a man, that does not decide this case . . . . It is clear from the evidence 
that if Eastern did discriminate against Ulane, it was not because she is female, 
but because Ulane is a transsexual—a biological male who takes female 
hormones, cross-dresses, and has surgically altered parts of her body to make it 
appear to be female.26 
Thus, rejecting the relevance of Karen’s personal identity or her social 
treatment, the Ulane court, as in Corbett, clung to the notion that there was some 
underlying reality of sex that human intervention could not change 
(presumably, which could not plausibly have been misidentified at Karen’s 
birth) and that the law also embodied. 
 
 19. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)-(2) (2006) (“It shall be an 
unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any 
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, 
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, 
or national origin; or to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in 
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or 
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin.”). 
 20. Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1082 (7th Cir. 1984). 
 21. Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 581 F.Supp. 821, 838 (N.D. Ill. 1983), rev’d, 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 
1984). 
 22. Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1085, 1087. 
 23. Id. at 1085-86. 
 24. Id. at 1085. 
 25. Id. at 1087. 
 26. Id. (emphasis added). 
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Recent U.S. appellate decisions in the context of disputed marriages 
involving transpersons come from Texas—Littleton v. Prange,27 decided in 1999—
from Kansas—In re Estate of Gardiner,28 decided in 2002—from Ohio—In re 
Marriage License for Nash,29 decided at the end of 2003—from Florida—Kantaras v. 
Kantaras,30 decided in 2004—and from Illinois—In re Marriage of Simmons,31 
decided in 2005.32  Both Littleton and Gardiner discuss Corbett, treat it favorably 
(whether explicitly or implicitly), and deny legal recognition of the claimed sex 
of the transgender litigants, and thus of their marriages;33 Nash and Kantaras rely 
on Gardiner and an earlier Ohio marriage case that in turn followed Corbett.34 
Littleton was a wrongful death decision where a doctor contested the 
validity of a marriage based on the sex of the widow, Christie Lee Littleton, a 
woman with a transsexual history whom the doctor claimed was still male.35  
The Texas court framed the issue as: “[w]hen is a man a man, and when is a 
woman a woman?”36  It began its analysis of Christie Lee’s legal sex with 
Corbett, which it noted was routinely cited in subsequent transgender marriage 
cases.37  Correctly reading Corbett as holding that “once a man, always a man,”38 
the Littelton court likewise believed that sex or gender is forever.  In a passage 
suggesting a sectarian religious basis for that belief, the lead opinion said: “The 
deeper philosophical (and now legal) question is: can a physician change the 
gender of a person with a scalpel, drugs and counseling, or is a person’s gender 
immutably fixed by our Creator at birth?”39  Because sexual confirmation 
treatments, including surgeries, cannot change male chromosomes, the court 
concluded that “[b]iologically a post-operative female transsexual is still a 
male.”40  The Court believed (although with no other evidence of Christie’s 
chromosomes), that “[t]he facts contained in the original birth certificate were 
true and accurate,”41 and that the “fact” of Christie’s birth sex, to which the 
court equated her legal sex, could not be changed by mere mortals.42 
 
 27. 9 S.W.3d 223 (Tex. App. 1999). 
 28. 42 P.3d 120 (Kan. 2002). 
 29. 2003 WL 23097095 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 31, 2003); see also In re Ladrach, 513 N.E.2d 828 (Ohio 
Prob. Ct. 1987) (also denying legal recognition of transperson’s lived sex). 
 30. 884 So.2d 155 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004). 
 31. 825 N.E.2d 303 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005). 
 32. See generally In re Heilig, 816 A.2d 68 (Md. 2003) (holding that state’s circuit courts had 
jurisdiction to declare that a person had changed sex and remanding for evidence of permanent and 
irreversible change on the part of the petitioner). 
 33. Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 232 (Tex. App. 1999); Gardiner, 42 P.3d at 136; Simmons, 825 
N.E. 2d. at 956. 
 34. But cf. Heilig, 816 A.2d 68 (Md. 2003) (holding that state’s circuit courts had jurisdiction to 
declare that a person had changed sex and remanding for evidence of permanent and irreversible 
change on the part of the petitioner). 
 35. Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 225. 
 36. Id. at 223. 
 37. Id. at 226. 
 38. Id. at 227. 
 39. Id. at 224. 
 40. Id. at 230. 
 41. Id. at 231. 
 42. Id. 
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Similarly, though without the overt religious overtones, the Gardiner court 
ousted transsexual woman J’Noel Gardiner from her inheritance after her 
husband died without a will.43  The court accepted the plea of the deceased’s 
son—allegedly estranged from his father for 16 years44—that the widow was not 
a woman, and so the marriage was invalid45 because J’Noel had been born 
male.46  Kansas’s marriage statute limited marriage to a man and a woman, and 
the court held as a matter of law that J’Noel Gardiner was not a woman entitled 
to marry a man in Kansas.47  The Gardiner court listed Corbett as the first in a line 
of cases treating birth biology as determinative of people’s legal sex.48  Although 
the Gardiner court purported to treat the issue of J’Noel’s sex as “one of law and 
not fact,”49 its analysis of the terms “sex,” “male,” and “female” in the marriage 
statute referenced dictionary definitions, which treated the terms as denoting 
biological facts.50  J’Noel could not be a woman because “the ability to ‘produce 
ova and bear offspring’ does not and never did exist” on her part.51  Because 
J’Noel was “born a male,”52 the birth circumstance of biology determined her 
legal sex and inability to marry forever in the eyes of the Kansas Supreme 
Court.53 
The following year, in contrast to Littleton and Gardiner, the Ohio Court of 
Appeals in In re Marriage License for Nash54 did not cite Corbett in its opinion.  
Nash’s logic was the same, however, and it did rely on Gardiner55 and another 
case that in turn followed Corbett.56  The case arose when transsexual man Jacob 
Nash’s applications for a license to marry unquestioned woman Erin Barr were 
rejected.  The trial court twice refused their applications because it viewed Jacob 
as female and the couple thus as same-sex and ineligible to marry in Ohio.57  On 
appeal, Jacob again lost, with the appellate court viewing his legal sex as 
unalterably set by the fact of his birth biology.  Even though Jacob had amended 
his Massachusetts birth certificate after his transition to indicate his sex as male, 
 
 43. In re Estate of Gardiner, 42 P.3d 120, 136-37 (Kan. 2002). 
 44. Id. at 122; see also Brief of Appellant at 22, In re Estate of Gardiner, 42 P.3d 120 (Kan. 2002) 
(No. 00-85030-A) (estranged from 1983 until death in 1999). 
 45. See, e.g., Gardiner, 42 P.3d at 137 (“J’Noel remains a transsexual, and a male for purposes of 
marriage under [Kansas law].”). 
 46. See, e.g., id. at 135 (“A male-to-female post-operative transsexual does not fit the definition of 
a female.); id. at 137 (“We are not blind to the stress and pain experienced by one who is born a male 
but perceives oneself as a female. . . .  However, the validity of J’Noel's marriage to Marshall is a 
question of public policy to be addressed by the legislature and not by this court.”) (emphasis 
added). 
 47. Id. at 136-37. 
 48. Id. at 124. 
 49. Id. at 135. 
 50. See id. at 135. 
 51. Id. at 135. 
 52. Id. at 137. 
 53. Id. 
 54. 2003 WL 23097095 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 31, 2003). 
 55. Id. at *7. 
 56. See In re Ladrach, 513 N.E.2d 828, 832 (Ohio Prob. Ct. 1987) (citing, discussing, and reaching 
the same conclusion as Corbett). 
 57. See In re Marriage License for Nash, 2003 WL 23097095 at *1-*2. 
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the Ohio court held that (under Massachusetts law), the birth certificate was 
merely “prima facie evidence of the facts recorded,”58 and here “the amended 
birth certificate submitted by Nash as evidence of his sex was rebutted by the 
evidence already in possession of the trial court, to wit, Nash’s original birth 
certificate designating Nash’s sex as female.”59 
Now, the original birth certificate could only trump the amended certificate 
if birth sex were given legal priority over “sex” as subsequently determined by 
the amending court, which had received a letter from Jacob’s “family physician, 
indicating that Nash had undergone gender reassignment surgery.”60  Like prior 
non-recognition decisions, the Nash court was relying on the conception of legal 
“sex” as an unalterable natural fact about persons set no later than birth: “public 
policy in Ohio concerning changes to birth certificates is to allow a court to 
‘correct[ ] Errors/Mistakes Only on the original birth record,’ and not changes in 
the sexual designation when the original designation was correct.”61 
Next, in Kantaras,62 the appellate court in Florida decided that transsexual 
man Michael Kantaras’ marriage was void because Michael was not a male as 
required by the marriage laws of Florida, and therefore not able to marry female 
Linda.63  After surveying various decisions disputing or recognizing the avowed 
sex of transsexual persons,64 the Kantaras court simply asserted, with scarce a 
word of explanation, that it “disagree[d]”65 with the recognition decisions and 
chose instead to side with the non-recognition decisions, including Gardiner.66  
What the court did say was that it agreed that “the common meaning of male 
and female, as those terms are used statutorily, . . . refer[s] to immutable traits 
determined at birth.”67  So, once again, legal sex is taken to be a natural fact, 
unchangeable, established at birth. 
In the most recent published sortie of a U.S. court in this area, the Appellate 
Court of Illinois affirmed the termination of Sterling Robert Simmons’ parental 
rights, and thus any possibility of his seeking custody of his twelve-year-old 
child, because Mr. Simmons was a transsexual man.68  There was no claim of 
fraud or deception by Simmons’s non-transsexual spouse Jennifer; she and 
Simmons had their child via artificial insemination.69  The problems arose only 
when Simmons later sought a divorce and custody of their child.  In response, 
Jennifer argued that Simmons had no rights because the couple was not validly 
married as Simmons was not legally male.  Agreeing, the court held that the 
 
 58. Id. at *4 (emphasis added). 
 59. Id. at *5. 
 60. Id. at *1. 
 61. Id. at *6 (emphasis in original). 
 62. 884 So.2d 155 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004). 
 63. Id. at 155-56. 
 64. See id. at 158-60. 
 65. Id. at 161. 
 66. See id. at 158-61. 
 67. Id. at 161. 
 68. See In re Marriage of Simmons, 825 N.E.2d 303 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005). 
 69. See id. at 307. 
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Simmonses’ marriage was invalid70 and, thus, that the artificial insemination 
agreement and various state parentage laws were all inapplicable.71 
In re Marriage of Simmons is a disconcerting, but sadly not atypical decision.  
The court did not engage in any examination (let alone a candid discussion) of 
the purposes of the mixed-sex requirement for civil marriage and of how 
recognizing Simmons’ avowed sex, and thus the validity of his marriage, would 
or would not have served those purposes.  The court offered no legal definition 
of sex, of male and female, for which it might then have been held accountable 
on appeal or for which the state legislature might be held accountable for its 
supposed political judgment that those were appropriate definitions and 
attendant limitations. 
Rather, the Illinois judges uncritically acted as if legal sex, for purposes of 
various statutory enactments, were a mere brute biological fact.  The court said 
that the trial court’s decision “should be overturned only if it is against the 
manifest weight of the evidence.”72  And, given testimony that Simmons still had 
“all his female genitalia”73 (despite having had all his “internal female organs” 
removed74), the appellate court concluded “that the judgment of the trial court 
that [Simmons] is a female and not legally a male was not against the manifest 
weight of the evidence.”75  Thus, Sterling Simmons’s purported marriage to 
Jennifer was invalid.  From that, the court therefore concluded that Simmons 
was not a married “man within the meaning of the [Illinois Parentage Act of 
1984].”76 
But the court was at best incomplete in its reasoning here, in a way 
engendered by its unvoiced commitments to a particular gender ideology.77  The 
judges nowhere offered a definition of male or female for purposes of the 
Parentage Act, or any other Illinois law.  Indeed, their conclusion (quoted above) 
was that there was no reversible error in the district court’s holding that 
Simmons “is a female and not legally male”78 or, as the court phrases it 
elsewhere, “is a woman and not legally male.”79  In the judges’ views, so far as 
their official explanation allows them to be reconstructed, Simmons’ 
womanhood was just a fact of nature.  Thus, Simmons’ corrected birth certificate 
identifying him as male was dismissed because it could not, “legally speaking, 
 
 70. Id. at 309-10. 
 71. Id. at 311 (holding Section 3 of Illinois Parentage Act inapplicable); id. at 312 (holding 
Section 5 of Illinois Parentage Act of 1984 inapplicable); id. (holding common law breach of contract 
and promissory estoppel causes of action inapplicable); id. at 313 (rejecting de facto parent 
argument); id. (rejecting equitable estoppel argument); id. at 314 (holding laches and statute of 
limitations claims inapplicable).  The court also rejected arguments that the minor child had a right 
to a legally recognized parental relationship with Sterling Simmons.  Id. at 314-15. 
 72. Id. at 308 (emphasis added). 
 73. Id. at 309. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 312. 
 77. See David B. Cruz, Disestablishing Sex and Gender, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 997, 1006-11 (2002), for a 
discussion on the ideological character of sex/gender beliefs. 
 78. In re Marriage of Simmons, 825 N.E.2d at 308 (emphases added). 
 79. Id. at 307 (emphases emphasis added). 
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make [him] a male” and its issuance did not “involve fact-finding.”80  Hence, for 
these judges, any claim Simmons had to parental rights as a father must have 
been relying on a legal fiction, not the true facts that the court claimed the law 
reflected. 
Even though Sterling Simmons was a transsexual man, that appears to the 
justices to have seemed not a way of being a male, but only a way of being a 
female.  At least this was their view of someone such as Simmons who, the court 
suggested, “require[d] additional surgeries before sex reassignment c[ould] be 
considered completed.”81  But considered by whom?  The court relied on 
physicians who testified at trial,82 yet Simmons’s expert, a member of the Harry 
Benjamin International Gender Dysphoria Association83 who had “treated 
hundreds of transsexuals during his medical career[,] . . . described [Simmons] 
as a healthy male . . . .”84  When laws sanction the destruction of a parental 
relationship, we should understand the U.S. Constitution to require a greater 
justification than the unreflective acceptance of a gender ideology that allows 
invocation of supposed “facts of human nature”85 to supplant need for any 
democratically embraced, functional, secular defense.86 
Corbett and these other non-recognition decisions have been met with stern 
criticism from other academics besides me.87  Yet ostensibly progressive critics 
 
 80. Id. at 310 (emphases added). 
 81. Id. at 309.  Cf. JUDITH HALBERSTAM, FEMALE MASCULINITY 164 (1998) (referring to “full sex 
reassignment (if there is such a thing)”). 
 82. See In re Marriage of Simmons, 825 N.E.2d 303, 309 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005). 
 83. This group has since changed its name and is now known as The World Professional 
Association for Transgender Health, WPATH.  See WORLD PROF’L ASS’N FOR TRANSGENDER HEALTH, 
http://www.wpath.org (last visited Oct. 4, 2010). 
 84. Marriage of Simmons, 825 N.E.2d at 308 (emphasis added). 
 85. Cruz, supra note 77, at 1023. 
 86. See id. at 1020-27. 
 87. See, e.g., Richard F. Storrow, Naming the Grotesque Body in the “Nascent Jurisprudence of 
Transsexualism,” 4 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 275, 297-98 (1997) (concluding from Judge Ormrod’s 
explanation of his continued adherence to his viewst in Corbett“that shock alone has led the judiciary 
to rule that chromosomes are preferable to outward anatomy for the purposes of establishing sexual 
identity”); Mary Coombs, Sexual Dis-Orientation: Transgendered People and Same-Sex Marriage, 8 UCLA 
WOMEN’S L.J. 219, 246 (1998) (“The logical flaws in the procreation argument [in Corbett] are 
glaringly obvious.”); Leslie I. Lax,  Note, Is the United States Falling Behind? The Legal Recognition of 
Post-Operative Transsexuals’ Acquired Sex in the United States and Abroad, 7 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 
123, 141 (2003) (asserting “that even without the current medical knowledge, a much more 
humanitarian and practical decision could have been reached than that reached by the Corbett 
court.”); Helen G. Berrigan, Transsexual Marriage: A Trans-Atlantic Judicial Dialogue, 12 L. & SEXUALITY 
REV.: LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, & TRANSGENDER LEGAL ISSUES 87, 112 (2003) (“Corbett’s depiction of 
the essence of marriage is outdated today[.]”); Mark Strasser, Harvesting the Fruits of Gardiner: On 
Marriage, Public Policy, and Fundamental Interests, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 179, 191 (2003) (“It is for 
good reason that the Corbett analysis has been subjected to strong criticisms which, in the words of 
the New Zealand High Court, ‘are difficult, indeed, impossible, to answer satisfactorily.’”) (citing 
Attorney-Gen. v Otahuhu Family Court, (1995) 1 NZLR 603, 606 (HC)); Terry S. Kogan, Transsexuals, 
Intersexuals, and Same-Sex Marriage, 18 BYU J. PUB. L. 371, 375 n.12 (2004) (citing several critical 
articles from 1970 through 1990); Briana Lynn Morgan, Note, The Use of Rules and Standards to Define 
a Transsexual’s Sex for the Purpose of Marriage: An Argument for a Hybrid Approach, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 
1329, 1341 (2004) (“Considering that [Corbett] is based on an outdated construct of marriage and over 
thirty-year-old inadequate scientific knowledge, it is unfathomable that any modern court would use 
this case as a basis for its decisions.”); Katrina C. Rose, A History of Gender Variance in Pre-20th 
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sometimes argue as if the problem is that law does not accurately track a more 
complex underlying fact of gender.  At the same time they bracket the normative 
question of the propriety of the mixed-sex requirement for civil marriage, 
merely asking how the law should approach sex determination questions to get 
them “right” on the assumption that the mixed-sex restriction on marriage is 
proper.  For example, Julie Greenberg, who has emerged as a leading legal 
authority on transgender and intersex issues, published a lengthy and 
influential article in the Arizona Law Review entitled, Defining Male and Female: 
Intersexuality and the Collision Between Law and Biology.88  This article was 
extensively relied on by the intermediate appellate court in Kansas that was 
ultimately reversed by the Kansas Supreme Court in Gardiner.89  In this piece, 
outstanding for bringing intersex issues into the legal literature in a sustained 
fashion, Professor Greenberg “proposes that the law reject the currently 
accepted biologically based model for determining sex and instead adopt a more 
flexible approach that emphasizes gender self-identification.”90 
Now, of course, the need for “determining sex” only arose for the Kansas 
courts in the marriage context because, like most jurisdictions today, Kansas 
restricts civil marriage to people of, what it statutorily refers to, as “the opposite 
sex.”91  Were this mixed-sex requirement not in place, the sex of transpersons 
would be generally irrelevant to the validity of the marriages into which they 
enter.  But what does Defining Male and Female have to say about that?  The 
article does not engage this root legal problem, asserting that, “[r]egardless of 
the legal, moral, and societal implications of prohibiting same-sex marriages,” 
the mixed-sex requirement “highlights the difficulty” of simplistic positions like 
that taken in Corbett.92  It criticizes “[t]he currently accepted binary model that 
determines an individual’s sex based primarily on the appearance of his/her 
external genitalia at birth” as “an inadequate system” because “it does not reflect 
reality.”93  According to the article’s view of scholarly imperatives, “[t]he 
dialogue must focus on whether sexual categories should be limited to the two 
traditional classifications of male and female or whether sex categorization 
should be expanded to include intersexuality as a sex category.”94 
Setting aside the views of some intersex activists that a third sex category 
would not be a solution,95 what of the mixed-sex requirement itself?  Should not 
 
Century Anglo-American Law, 14 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 77, 85 n.29 (2004) (suggesting that Rose’s prior 
labeling of “Corbett as ‘Ormrod’s Monster’ . . . is perhaps even insufficiently harsh”); Marybeth 
Herald, Transgender Theory: Reprogramming Our Automated Settings, 28 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 167, 172 
(2005) (criticizing “Corbett’s ostrich-like approach”). 
 88. Julie A. Greenberg, Defining Male and Female: Intersexuality and the Collision Between Law and 
Biology, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 265 (1999). 
 89. See In re Estate of Gardiner, 22 P.3d 1086, 1094-1100, 1110 (Kan. Ct. App. 2001). 
 90. Greenberg, supra note 88, at 270. 
 91. Gardiner, 22 P.3d at 1092. 
 92. Greenberg, supra note 88, at 269. 
 93. Id. at 278 (emphasis added). 
 94. Id. at 294. 
 95. See Alice D. Dreger & April M. Herndon, Progress and Politics in the Intersex Rights Movement: 
Feminist Theory in Action, 15 GLQ: J. LESBIAN & GAY STUD. 199, 217 (2009) (concluding that many 
intersex activist groups’ “advoca[cy of] raising all children as boys or girls,” is due to a belief that 
“intersex is not a discrete biological category, so someone would always be deciding who to raise as 
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scholarly discourse focus upon that limitation on marriage rights?  Defining Male 
and Female does fleetingly aver that “the current system must be analyzed to 
determine what principles of justice it advances.”96  Yet the article immediately 
eschews such normative inquiry, retreating into mere considerations of 
efficiency: “the underlying purposes of legislation that categorizes people based 
upon sex need to be examined to determine whether the current interpretation 
meets its presumed goal.”97 
Moreover, there are volumes of scholarship detailing the 
unconstitutionality of the mixed-sex requirement.98  A footnote late in the article 
Defining Male and Female gestures towards this, and makes a token obeisance 
toward justice with the perfunctory adjectives “persuasive” and “thoughtful,” 
writing that “[a] critique of the statutes and cases that prohibit gay and lesbian 
marriages is beyond the scope of this Article and has been thoroughly discussed 
in other scholarly works.”99  Then, in a practical but fatalistic move, the article 
sets aside any qualms about the injustice of the exclusion of same-sex couples 
from marriage: “[d]espite these criticisms, it appears that marriage will continue 
to be limited to heterosexual unions in most if not all jurisdictions for the 
foreseeable future.”100  And so, Defining Male and Female continues, through 
nearly 500 footnotes, in an effort to help courts get sex “right” for transsexual 
and intersex persons. 
I am not suggesting there is something intrinsically objectionable about 
academic investigations of a limited scope.  But, in some circumstances, they can 
be dangerous.101  Incremental reform projects that biologize legal sex run the risk 
of further entrenching sex naturalism and heterosexism.  Indeed, they might be 
seen as akin to asking how a court should decide what a person’s race ‘really’ is 
in a case involving possible violation of an anti-miscegenation law or possible 
race slavery.102  Certainly mixed-race litigants facing the prospect of slavery in 
 
male, female, or intersex: three categories don’t solve the problem any more than two or five or ten 
do.”). 
 96. Greenberg, supra note 88, at 295. 
 97. Id. 
 98. In an article published three years before Greenberg’s Defining Male and Female, Lynn 
Wardle reported that sixty-nine of seventy-two “articles notes, comments, or essays focusing 
primarily on same-sex marriage” published in law journals between 1990 and June 1995 “advocated, 
supported, or were generally sympathetic to same-sex marriage.”  Lynn D. Wardle, A Critical 
Analysis of Constitutional Claims for Same-Sex Marriage, 1996 BYU L. REV. 1, 18, 20 (1996).  Regardless 
of his somewhat paranoid explanation for the “imbalance,” id. at 18, in views, see id. at 20 (claiming 
existence of “an intellectual taboo against expressions unsympathetic to gay and lesbian 
prerogatives” as “at least partial[]” cause of said “imbalance”)., all of these should have been 
available prior to publication of Defining Male and Female. 
 99. Greenberg, supra note 88, at 307 n.334. 
 100. Id. 
 101. See, e.g., Dean Spade, Trans Law Reform Strategies, Co-Optation, and the Potential for 
Transformative Change, in 30 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 288, 312 (2009) (“In doing policy reform work we 
must assess whether any aspects of our reform project that are incremental are actually regressive.  
Doing so means having a clear vision of what the world is that we are fighting for, against which we 
can measure incremental steps in order to ensure that they are going in the right direction.”). 
 102. See Taylor Flynn, Instant (Gender) Messaging: Expression-Based Challenges to State Enforcement 
of Gender Norms, 18 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 465, 474 (2009) (“Significantly, the law’s structure 
meant that Mr. Plessy had to frame his claim within the confines of racial identity as envisioned by 
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the antebellum United States103 or invalidation of their marriages in the 
twentieth century104 might have been excused (whether or not entirely justified) 
for arguing that they should be classified as white (and, thus, ineligible for 
chattel slavery, or eligible to marry a white person), thereby mitigating the 
unjust toll the racial regime of their era would have on them. 
But I believe that scholars writing articles, rather than briefs for a party, 
have a higher professional ethical duty than advancing whatever might help one 
particular constituency.  We ought to provisionally accept, or at least recognize 
and acknowledge, the harms our work can wreak.  Alas, however, even in a 
later article, When Is a Man a Man, and When Is a Woman a Woman?,105 critiquing 
the Texas decision in Littleton, Professor Greenberg simply takes as given “the 
policy concerns underlying the limitation of marriage to persons of the ‘opposite 
sex’” and argues that those concerns “must be analyzed and applied to 
marriages in which one of the spouses is a transsexual.”106  When Is a Man a Man 
notes that “[n]umerous scholars have called for an end to the ban on same-sex 
marriages,”107 but the article does not itself endorse this call.  Rather, accepting 
 
those in power at the time.  He was thus required to run the risk that a successful claim would 
reproduce even (and ever) more intricate levels of racial apartheid, as courts determined how much 
‘whiteness’ was ‘white enough’ to fit the racial identity standards of the day.  History revealed that 
such rulings, nonetheless, became part of the legal landscape as courts adjudicated whiteness and 
blackness for others who did not fit neatly into a racial binary.”). 
 103. See, e.g., Ian F. Haney Lopez, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on Illusion, 
Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1994) (discussing Hudgins v. Wrights, 11 Va. 
134 (Sup. Ct. App. 1806), in which the freedom of three generations of women rested on the legal 
determination of their race). 
 104. See, e.g., Ariela J. Gross, “The Caucasian Cloak”: Mexican Americans and the Politics of Whiteness 
in the Twentieth-Century Southwest, 95 GEO. L.J. 337, 348-54 (2007) (discussing three court cases from 
southwestern state supreme courts involving the validity of interracial marriages turning on the 
races of those married). 
 105. Julie A. Greenberg, When Is a Man a Man, and When Is a Woman a Woman?, 52 FLA. L. REV. 
745 (2000). 
 106. Id. at 760. 
My criticism here does not contradict my discussion of accountability vel non in Simmons.  See supra 
paragraph after note 71.  There, I criticized the court for refusing to define its terms, an action that 
could leave its definitions open to attack and thus foster accountability.  Here, I criticize Greenberg 
for accepting unjust definitions without seeking in any manner to hold their promulgators 
responsible for their injustice. 
This is a failing of which I have been guilty on occasion, for as Ruthann Robson points out (although 
in excessively strong terms), some of my earlier work on the expressive function of marriage fails to 
condemn unjust allocations of expressive authority.  See Ruthann Robson, Assimilation, Marriage, and 
Lesbian Liberation, 75 TEMP. L. REV. 709, 798 (2002) (accusing David B. Cruz, “Just Don’t Call It 
Marriage”: The First Amendment and Marriage as an Expressive Resource, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 925, 937, 939, 
942 (2001), of approving of certain social circumstances used to argue for equal rights for same-sex 
couples to the expressive resource of civil marriage).  While I believe Professor Robson’s reading of 
my article uncharitably attributed approbation to me on the basis of an absence of condemnation, 
she was right to criticize the latter. 
To be clear, I do not claim that Professor Greenberg actually approves of the anti-gay character of the 
mixed-sex requirement for civil marriage.  I do maintain that her arguments about how to make 
mixed-sex requirements for civil marriage work better (for transsexuals and intersex people) are 
complicitous in the heterosexist project characterized by the exclusion of same-sex couples from civil 
marriage. 
 107. Greenberg, supra note 105, at 762. 
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the mixed-sex requirement for civil marriage, which David Richards has 
characterized as an element of “moral slavery,”108When Is a Man a Man then 
turns its attention to the question whether courts and should declare “whether 
[transwoman] Christie [can] legally marry [unquestioned male] Jonathon or 
[unquestioned female] Jane?”109  This complicity with heterosupremacy is 
troubling. 
It is not that Professor Greenberg and I are all that far apart at the bottom 
line, although her arguments reinforce heterosexist laws (by seeking to apply, 
rather than to attack, the mixed-sex requirement for civil marriage) and valorize 
medical authority (by seeking to make legal sex match medical 
pronouncements—which is a bit curious in light of her extensive work 
questioning dominant medical approaches to the treatment of intersex persons).  
I suspect we are both committed to the proposition that, ideally, a person’s sex 
should for many or most purposes be determined by that person herself or 
himself—and I am using these pronouns, with their validation of the 
male/female dichotomy, because of the gendered limits of the English language.  
And where law does not recognize such self-determination, I suspect we both 
would insist it have powerful (perhaps most often remedial) rationales for 
relying on sex to allocate legal rights or duties.  We should all individually be 
able to make gender self-determinations in an exercise of our conscientious 
convictions as free and equal persons. 
In my view, this is not only a moral conclusion but also the proper, 
constitutionally compelled legal conclusion, at least in the United States under 
its ostensibly secular, representative, and humanly accountable democracy.  In 
other research currently in progress, I explore the foundations for such a 
conclusion in the First Amendment, the Due Process Clauses, and the Equal 
Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution.  But additional arguments have 
already been developed that support this conclusion. 
The Constitution could be understood to protect individuals’ free exercise 
of gender, as well as to require the disestablishment of sex and gender.  As this 
phrasing reflects, I have argued this position by analogy to the constitutional 
treatment of religion: “Both religion and gender involve ideology and social 
organization, rely in their descriptions and prescriptions on extra-human 
authority, and implicate individual and group identity deeply, in ways making 
them simultaneously important as matters of conscience and potentially 
threatening as divisive forces tending toward installation or reinforcement of 
hierarchy.”110 
Like religion, gender is ideological, for it is a way of imposing order on, 
and making sense of, the world; it is a matter of belief, often nonrational and 
non-falsifiable.  People commonly insist that there are precisely two mutually 
exclusive and exhaustive sexes, male and female.  For example, when a bill was 
introduced to amend California law to allow transsexual persons born in the 
state to change the sex designation on their birth certificates, the Campaign for 
 
 108. See David A.J. Richards, Abolitionist Feminism, Moral Slavery, and the Constitution: “On the 
Same Platform of Human Rights,” 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 767, 832-33 (1996). 
 109. Greenberg, supra note 105, at 763. 
 110. Cruz, Disestablishing Sex and Gender, supra note 77, at 1005-06. 
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California Families (“CCF”) issued an “Assembly Floor Alert” opposing the bill 
and a publication entitled “The Anti-Nature Transsexual Agenda.”  According 
to CCF: 
AB 194 is an attack on nature. People are born with 46 chromosomes, XX for 
females and XY for males. You are born either male or female, and there are no 
in-betweens. This bill would promote an unnatural and radical sexual agenda 
that erodes nature and attacks the sensibilities of families. This bill would have 
the State supporting the gruesome procedure of men and women having their 
sex organs altered and removed.111 
It may matter little to CCF that current medicine flatly contradicts these 
claims.112  This convenient and, to many, comforting, binary schema is woefully 
inadequate to deal not only with science but also with the lived realities of 
intersex and transsexual persons.  It is an ideological belief. 
Like religion, gender is at the same time also a matter of social 
organization, a way to divide people into groups sometimes assumed to share 
many important commonalities with others in their gender group, but not with 
others in a different gender group.  Gender is thus a matter of identification and 
affiliation.  Indeed, gender identifications can run quite deep and prompt 
visceral reactions.  Many readers of this Essay may not need to be reminded of 
the horrific violence that is often perpetrated on those who are seen as 
threatening the gendered order—and thus the perpetrators’ sense of their own 
place in our gendered world.113 
Furthermore, both religion and gender have historically and recently 
turned to extra-human sources of descriptive and normative authority.  God and 
Nature have both widely been taken to provide explanations for, and 
justifications of, a host of religious and gender beliefs.  This displacement of 
human responsibility for our dividing practices constitutes a key and troubling 
point of commonality between religion and gender.114 
And it is precisely the valorization of “nature” through notions of “medical 
science” and, thus, biology, and the attendant displacement of human 
responsibility, that I am concerned about.  I worry that a similar refusal of 
 
 111. Id. at 1015. 
 112. See, e.g., Greenberg, supra note 88, at 281, 283-84 (listing chromosomal patterns other than 
XX and XY and discussing chromosomal disorders); Vernon A. Rosario, Quantum Sex: Intersex and 
the Molecular Deconstruction of Sex, 15 GLQ: J. LESBIAN & GAY STUD. 267 (2009) (critiquing idea that 
sex is determined binarily by X and Y chromosomes); id. at 274 (“Rapid advances in the genetics of 
sex determination have completely trashed the 1950s notion that the human Y chromosome alone 
determines male sex.”); id. at 277 (concluding that “only the most distorted and simplistic reading of 
the contemporary molecular biology of sex determination would suggest that it leads to a 
dichotomization of sex or gender”); id. at 279 (“Molecular genetics is likely to require a shift from 
binary sex to quantum sex, with a dozen or more genes each conferring a small percentage 
likelihood of male or female sex that is still further dependent on micro- and macro-environmental 
interactions.”). 
 113. See, e.g., David B. Cruz, Controlling Desires: Sexual Orientation Conversion and the Limits of 
Knowledge and Law, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 1297, 1342-44 (1999) (discussing anti-lesbigay violence); Cruz, 
Disestablishing Sex and Gender, supra note 77, at 1016-20 (critically discussing psychological 
mechanisms of sex identification and religion). 
 114. See Cruz, Disestablishing Sex and Gender, supra note 77, at 1011-16, 1020-27 (explaining and 
criticizing such displacements of responsibility). 
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judgment may underlie the eager embrace of the medical profession and 
medical standards by pro-reform scholars and judges dealing with transsexual 
and intersex identity.  The appeal to the self-evident normative authority of an 
autonomous and seemingly objective discipline such as medicine might seem to 
shield one from the perils or responsibility of taking a stand in making a 
recommendation or decision on what is, after all, a matter of law and a social 
issue.  Whether or not there are Platonic forms, pure essences that exist 
independent of human recognition, those are not what law uses.  Law is a 
human project, using human categories instrumentally for human purposes. 
It misdirects our focus, to someone’s political detriment, to appeal to the 
natural or to “the facts” of sex (as proclaimed by medical practitioners) as the 
basis for what are really political judgments about what identities and 
relationships to recognize.  This happens in articles and opinions that repeatedly 
invoke “reality” or “biological reality”; birth attendants that succeed or fail to 
record “accurate gender”; supposed “historical facts” in birth registries that all 
seem to presume there is some objective “truth” of sex or gender,115 discernable 
if only we try harder to set aside old ways of thinking and turn to the “experts.”  
Indeed, even many transsexual persons’ “discovery narratives” (which we 
certainly must recognize are favored by clinicians and reform-minded courts) 
invoke some true essence of sex,116 a truth recognizable by legal systems if only 
 
 115. See, e.g., In re Cossey, [1991] Fam Law 362 (“An entry in a birth register and the certificate 
derived therefrom are records of facts at the time of birth.  Thus, in England and Wales the birth 
certificate constitutes a document revealing not current identity, but historical facts.  The system is 
intended to provide accurate and authenticated evidence of the events themselves . . . .”); Rees v. 
United Kingdom [1993] 2 FCR 49 (refusing to find violation of European Charter of Human Rights in 
the United Kingdom’s’s refusal to allow transsexual woman to change sex designation on birth 
certificate because those were treated as records of historical facts); Goodwin v. United Kingdom, 35 
Eur. Ct. H.R. 18, at ¶ 23 (2002) (“A birth certificate accordingly constitutes a document revealing not 
current identity but historical facts.”); I v. United Kingdom, 36 Eur. Ct. H.R. 53 (2003), at ¶ 21 (“The 
1953 Act provides for the correction by the Registrar of clerical errors or factual errors. The official 
position is that an amendment may only be made if the error occurred when the birth was 
registered.”); Corbett v. Corbett, 2 All E.R. 33, 47 (1970) (Eng.) (“The respondent’s operation, 
therefore, cannot affect her true sex.”); In re Ladrach, 513 N.E.2d 828, 832 (Ohio Prob. Ct. 1987) 
(quoting same language from Corbett and “conclud[ing] that there is no authority in Ohio for the 
issuance of a marriage license to consummate a marriage between a post-operative male to female 
transsexual person and a male person.”); id. (concluding that transsexual petitioner was not entitled 
to birth certificate change or to marry a male because she was “correctly designated ‘Boy’ on [her] 
birth certificate.”); Anonymous v. Anonymous, 325 N.Y.S.2d 499, 500 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1971) (“[I]t 
would appear from the medical articles and other information supplied by counsel, that mere 
removal of the male organs would not, in and of itself, change a person into a true female.”); 
Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 231 (Tex. App. 1999) (“No one claims the information contained in 
Christie's original birth certificate was based on fraud or error. . . .  At the time of birth, Christie was 
a male, both anatomically and genetically.  The facts contained in the original birth certificate were 
true and accurate . . . .”).  Cf. Attorney-Gen. v Otahuhu Family Court, (1995) 1 NZLR 603, 629 (HC) 
(“There is no social advantage in the law not recognising the validity of the marriage of a transsexual 
in the sex of reassignment.  It would merely confirm the factual reality.”); Sheffield v. United 
Kingdom, (1999) 27 E.H.R.R. 163, 198 (De Meyer, J., Valticos, J., and Morenilla J., concurring) (“It was 
not contested that the birth certificates of the two applicants and the related entries in the register of 
births correctly mentioned the sex they were when they came into the world.  The fact that they have 
subsequently ‘changed’ sex gives them no right to have their ‘new’ sex mentioned in their birth 
certificates or register entries.  That would be a falsification.”). 
 116. See, e.g., Ronald R. Garet, Self-Transformability, 65  S. CAL. L. REV. 121 (1991). 
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they could get past simplistic measures of sex like the natal concordance of 
gonads, genitals, and chromosomes promulgated in Corbett.117 
As Sally Sheldon has written about the medicalization of abortion law in 
Britain, “[t]he doctors’ power to define is accepted and reinforced, with other 
accounts pushed to the margins.  This depoliticizes the judicial decision which 
can be legitimated with reference to scientific truth and is thus seen as 
uninfluenced by personal moral or political belief.”118  This is as true of sex 
determination as it is of abortion.  Now, Professor Sheldon found in her study 
that what “the courts did in these cases is actively to protect and entrench the 
monopoly of doctors, while policing those marginal cases which did not fall 
within the bounds of good medical practice.”119  Again, my worry is that this can 
happen in the trans area, with those doctors whom I would consider more 
“progressive,” the ones more willing to come close to saying that a person’s sex 
ought to be determined by their gender identity regardless of surgical, 
hormonal, or other medical interventions, are likely to be the ones dismissed by 
law and marginalized. 
Granted, there have been some practical benefits of medicalization in the 
abortion regulation context in Britain.  As Sheldon found, “[i]n general, it seems 
that this largely acts to protect, rather than to impinge upon, women’s 
reproductive autonomy.”120  Likewise, medicalization can give a way for some 
courts to recognize some litigants’ new legal sex identity,121 and a way for some 
number of persons to access medical care and gender confirming surgeries 
through insurance, as well as to make disability discrimination claims.122 
But Sheldon raises an important cautionary note that we should not 
overlook in this context: 
If the courts continue to adhere to the position of strong preference for medical 
self-regulation which has been so in evidence, then it seems that where the law 
has been effective in protecting the doctor-patient relationship from outside 
attacks, it is likely to be less useful at protecting reproductive autonomy within 
it.  As such, while the alliance with medical interests may have had strategic 
advantages, it remains inadequate as a basis for building and protecting 
women’s reproductive autonomy within the courts.123 
 
 117. See supra text accompanying note 10. 
 118. Sally Sheldon, Subject Only to the Attitude of the Surgeon Concerned: The Judicial Protection of 
Medical Discretion, 5 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 95, 96 (1996); see also id. at 97 (“By ‘medicalization,’ then, I 
intend a broad movement by which increased weight is placed on the value of medical knowledge 
and the power of medical professionals is extended and entrenched.”). 
 119. Id. at 106. 
 120. Id. at 107. 
 121. The Florida circuit court judge in In re Kantaras presided over a more-than-three-week trial 
replete with medical experts’ testimony and rendered an 809-page written opinion finding in favor 
of Michael Kantaras.  In re Kantaras, No. 98-5375CA (Fla Cir. Ct. filed Feb. 21, 2003).  This particular 
legal success, however, was short-lived, as the District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court.  
Kantaras v. Kantaras, 884 So.2d 155 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004). 
 122. See, e.g., Dean Spade, Resisting Medicine, Re/Modeling Gender, 18 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 15, 
35 (2003). 
 123. Sheldon, supra note 118, at 108; see also Sydney Tarzwell, Note, The Gender Lines Are Marked 
With Razor Wire: Addressing State Prison Policies and Practices for the Management of Transgender 
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Similarly, it may be that medicalization might undermine the law’s 
capacity to protect gender autonomy within doctor-patient relationships.  By 
urging courts to defer to medicine where people have completed medical 
processes, courts could be more likely to side with a doctor over a trans client, 
particularly if the client exercises their constitutional right to refuse certain 
recommended treatments124 in cases where there is a dispute about whether law 
should recognize them as a different sex now.  Moreover, “it is important to 
remember that the women in the front of the queue to be sacrificed in the 
strategy of ‘playing it safe’ are the most vulnerable—those who are unable to 
afford a termination outside of the NHS and who have least knowledge of how 
to play the system.”125 
The same is likely to be true with respect to transgender issues,126 although 
this may to some extent be true of our legal system for any dispute: class and 
wealth matter.  For example, as Dean Spade has observed, some jurisdictions 
rely on genital surgeries to determine when they will accept a gender 
reclassification, and this then “has an income-based impact, causing greater 
obstacles for middle- and low-income people who cannot afford to pay out of 
pocket for the procedure, if they even want or need it.”127 
Turning from the arguments that should or should not be made by 
academics to those attorneys who must advocate to advance their clients’ 
interests, there are certainly better and worse ways of arguing for legal 
recognition of one’s own or one’s client’s identity.  Consider, for example, the 
arguments made by counsel for J’Noel Gardiner, the widow of Marshall 
Gardiner whose sex identification and marriage were repudiated by the Kansas 
Supreme Court.128  Many of the arguments made on J’Noel’s behalf might be 
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medical expertise and authority establish administrative norms that harm marginalized people”).  
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services.”); id. at 359 (“Most people who experience discrimination cannot afford to access legal help, 
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classified as part of an “Oppress Them, Not Me” strategy of playing to judicial 
heterosexism.  Thus, as has happened in other pro-trans contexts,129  J’Noel’s 
briefs frequently attempt to draw an unbridgeable gulf between gay and lesbian 
persons and transpersons, even in patently false ways.  For example, J’Noel’s 
brief repeatedly beat the reader over the head with the assertion that “a 
transsexual is not a homosexual.”130  While this refrain might have tried to make 
the mere point that there is no necessary connection between transsexuality and 
homosexuality, J’Noel goes further, avowing that “[a] homosexual engages in 
sexual relations with a member of his or her same sex.  A transsexual does 
not.”131  According to J’Noel, transsexuals “desire the removal of [the wrong 
sexual] apparatus and further surgical assistance in order that they may enter 
into normal heterosexual relationships.”132  However much transsexuality and 
homosexuality are erroneously conflated in society, J’Noel’s claim is plainly not 
true of all transsexual persons, many of whom do identify as lesbian or gay.  
Moreover, as Judith Halberstam has observed, “the simple opposition of 
transsexual versus gay and lesbian masks many other lines of affiliation and 
coalition that already exist within multiple queer communities [. . .  .]”133 
There was no need for J’Noel’s attorneys to make such claims simply to 
distance her from homosexuality.  Consider in contrast the litigation in the 
Kantaras134 case in the state of Florida.  There, an estranged wife, Linda Kantaras, 
challenged the validity of her marriage to transsexual man Michael Kantaras in 
a divorce and custody proceeding.  Like J’Noel, Michael also tried to educate the 
court about transsexual persons, but he did not miseducate in the way that 
J’Noel did.  Thus, although distinguishing between transsexuality and 
homosexuality, Kantaras’ attorneys recognized and admitted that some 
transsexual men “identify as gay because they are attracted to men.”  This less 
inflammatory approach might not be coincidental, for Michael was represented 
by the National Center for Lesbian Rights. 
Perhaps less praiseworthy is Kantaras’ argument, similar to J’Noel’s, 
though perhaps less strident, that “the state’s interest in limiting marriage to 
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85030-A), 2000 WL 35794477. 
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heterosexual unions . . . is most clearly and directly supported by recognizing 
rather than nullifying” the Kantarases’ marriage, based in large part on its social 
acceptance as a heterosexual union.  On the other hand, one contending that his 
marriage is valid in order to preserve his parental rights cannot simply deny or 
ignore states’ marriage laws, however heterosexist they may be.  Moreover, 
these arguments formed a very small portion of Kantaras’ briefs, which devoted 
many more pages to other arguments grounded in, for example, rights of 
medical privacy and autonomy. 
This individualistic focus is, I have argued above, far more normatively 
appropriate, at least in the U.S. context, than attempts to “get sex right,” and 
illuminate the supposedly objective “truth” of sex.  It better avoids a positivistic 
flight from normativity. 
Such ostensible refusal of judgment was at the core of the Kansas Supreme 
Court’s decision in Gardiner.  There, confronted with unruly bodies, with what it 
conceived as “people who do not fit neatly into the commonly recognized 
category of male or female,” the Court attempted to forswear judgment, 
concluding that “the validity of J’Noel’s marriage to Marshall is a question of 
public policy to be addressed by the legislature and not by this court.”135  But of 
course the court’s legal judgment did embody judgment, necessarily taking a 
stand on this “question of public policy” that had not been clearly addressed by 
any statute.  And in the same fashion, the appeals court in Kantaras purported 
simply to be relying on the legislature’s judgment that “a postoperative 
transsexual” person could not marry as a member of his lived sex.136  The court 
claimed it was simply enforcing “the common meaning” of “the terms male and 
female as they are used in the Florida marriage statutes,”137 but they gave no 
evidence of the Florida legislature’s intent or understanding, citing only the 
decisions of other courts about this supposed “common meaning.”138  Nor did 
the Florida court even bother to cite authority for the proposition that statutes 
were to be interpreted according to “common meaning.”139  The court insisted 
that if public policy were to require a change, that would have to come from the 
legislature.140  But the court never bothered to establish that the legislature’s 
policy would not recognize Michael Kantaras as male.141  Really, then, all we are 
left with is these judges’ certitude that a statute drafted to keep same-sex 
couples from marrying obviously means that phenotypically different-sex 
couples, both of whom had been identified as the same sex at birth, could not 
marry.  Presumably then, a phenotypically same-sex couple, one of whom had 
been identified as another sex at birth, would be allowed to marry—all as a 
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 141. See id. 
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matter of the “common meaning” of “male” and “female.”  This is not 
tremendously plausible, but it does allow the court to act as though it were 
making no interpretive choices, but simply following decisions of a community 
of linguistic practice. 
My fear about instead relying on medicine alone is that it might not give 
courts the resources to start building a true doctrine of gender autonomy.  
Medicalization encourages a delegation of authority over gender not to 
individuals, but to medical professionals, a class that has largely maintained 
itself as gatekeepers over, hence deniers of, access to various gender confirming 
treatments.142  Gender autonomy would instead vest primary authority for 
determining the gendered directions of our lives to us individually—something 
I think many people working and living in this area believe the law should do.  
Indeed, I would go further.  Under a view such as the disestablishment of sex 
and gender,143 almost all sex distinctions in law would be unconstitutional, and 
we thus would not need to fight these definitional legal battles day in and day 
out on as many fronts; to the extent that sex ceases to matter in law, getting sex 
“right” will seem less imperative.  I recognize the likely challenges in getting 
courts to accept such arguments, but I believe those challenges must be 
confronted and, eventually, overcome so that scholars and attorneys can 
support trans people without bolstering the regulatory power of psychiatry and 
medicine or reinforcing heterosexism. 
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